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TIME CERTAINTY IN NEGOTIABLE PAPER
RALPH . A IGLER
There is much unfortunate confusion and uncertainty in
the cases dealing with the various formal requisites of negotiable
paper. With reference to none of these requisites is the status of
the case law more unsatisfactory than it is in regard to the ele-
ment of certainty of time of maturity. Before the attempt at uni-
formity by means of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law
the confusion was pronounced, and this situation must have been
familiar to those who framed that act. That being true, one
cannot but wonder why the language of the N. I. L.1 was not
'The applicable provisions of the N. I. L. are as follows:
"Section i. . . . An instrument to be negotiable must conform to the
following requirements ..
"(3) Must be payable on demand, or at a fixed or determinable future
time . . ..
"Section 4. An instrument is payable at a determinable future time, within
the meaning of this act, which is expressed to be payable,
"(i) At a fixed period after date or sight; or
"(2) On or before a fixed or determinable future time specified therein; or
"(3) On or at a fixed period after the occurrence of a specified event,
which is certain to happen, though the time of happening be uncertain.
"An instrument payable upon a contingency is not negotiable, and the hap-
pening of the event does not cure-the defect.""Section 7. An instrtiment is payable on demand-
"(r) Where it is expressed to be payable on demand, or at sight, or on
presentation; or
"(2) In which no time for payment is expressed.
"Where an instrument is issued, accepted, or indorsed when overdue, it is,
as regards the person so issuing, accepting, or indorsing it, payable on demand."
(313)
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made sufficiently explicit to remove the difficulties and attain at
least a measure of uniformity. The problems seem sufficiently
important to warrant an examination of the various types of
situations.
The requirement of certainty as to time for payment is dic-
tated by much the same practical business considerations that
underlie the requisite of freedom from conditions. The worth
of the instrument in terms of money should be capable of de-
termination by inspection, aside from that feature which in-
evitably cannot be disclosed on the face of the paper-the finan-
cial status and responsibility of the parties. A promise or order,
however clearly expressed, to pay a stated sum at a time that may
never come, or at a time which cannot with reasonable business 2
certainty be determined from the terms of the paper, is necessarily
hopelessly uncertain as to its equivalent in money, if, indeed, it
can be said to be worth anything.3 In this respect some instru-
ments may offend both requirements as to freedom from condi-
tions and certainty of time. For example, a promise to pay
"when X shall marry" may be said to be not only completely un-
certain as to time of maturity but also to be conditioned upon
the marriage of X. On either ground an instrument with such a
promise could not be negotiable. 4
By Section 1-3 it is declared in general terms that an in-
strument to be negotiable "must be payable on demand, or at a
fixed or determinable future time." Of these three alternatives
two were deemed necessary of further statutory definition: "de-
""Business" certainty is a much different thing from mathematical or com-
putable certainty. An instrument payable "at sight" or "on demand" is a good
example. In a practical business sense such paper is unobjectionable so far as
indefiniteness of time for payment is concerned, although obviously the date
when payment is to be made cannot be pointed to with any degree of certainty.
' There are, of course, other reasons contributing to the requirement of cer-
tainty of time of maturity; for example, the necessity of determining whether
one is taking overdue paper, the need of making presentment and giving notice of
dishonor at the right time, etc. See Chafee, Acceleration Provisions in Time
Paper (919) 32 HAm. L. REv. 747, 753-754.
'The time the creditor must wait for his money determines largely the
amount of discount or premium the paper carries; hence, independently of the
contingency element as to whether the money will ever be payable, there is the
necessity for a fixed or determinable date of maturity. As to the conditional
element, see the writer's Conditions in Bills and Notes (1928) 26 MicH. L.
REv. 471.
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mand" paper is treated in Section 7; paper payable at a "determin-
able future time" is considered in Section 4. The meaning of
"fixed" future time was evidently thought to need no further eluci-
dation.
FIXED FUTURE TIME
There is no particular form of expression in which the "fixed"
future time must be stated. For example, an order: "$25o.oo.
August 14, 19O1, Mr. Win. Tebo will please pay to R. J. Torpey
or order two hundred and fifty dollars and charge to my account.
Due Oct. i. John Ryan," was held to be a good bill of exchange,'
being payable at a fixed future time.5
Questions inevitably will arise as to whether the fixed future
time has been stated with sufficient definiteness. It will be noted
that in the case just cited the bill though dated "August 14, 1901"
was declared to be due on October first, not mentioning the year.
That the next succeeding first of October was meant would seem
clear, and the court so read the document. But in a recent Wash-
ington case 6 a trade acceptance dated August I, 1919, and de-
livered on or about that date was deemed to be incomplete or
irregular because the only attempt to fix the due date was: "On
December I, pay to the order of G. W. Laing." Accordingly it
was concluded that the plaintiff was not a holder in due course,
the instrument he bought not being "complete and regular" as re-
quired by Section 5o-i. To any but a legally trained mind the
date of maturity would not have caused a moment's hesitation,
7
'Torpey v. Tebo, 184 Mass. 307, 68 N. E. 223 (903). The court said, at
308, 68 N. E. at 224, that the words, "due Oct. i," meant that the $250 in ques-
tion was to be due October i, "that is to say, is to be paid October i."
aUnited Ry. & Logging Supply Co. v. Siberian Commercial Co., 117 Wash.
347, 201 Pac. 21 (1921), i9 A. L. R. 5o6 (1922).
'Some reliance was placed upon In re Estate of Philpott, 169 Iowa 555, 151
N. W. 825 (I915), Ann. Cas. 1917B 839, in -which, however, the note in question
was payable "on or before four . . . after date," which presented an entirely
different situation.
In Collins v. Trotter, 81 Mo. 275 (1883), a note dated June 29, 1878, was
made payable on the "first day of March," and the court held it to be payable on
demand. And in Washington County Bank v. Jerome, 8 Mich. 490 (i86o), a
note which bore date "July 2o, I855," read as follows: "One year, August i5th,
after date, we promise to pay . " It was held that the note was due on
August i5th, 1856.
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but because in the court's judgment it could not be said what De-
cember first was meant, the maturity date was uncertain and the
instrument was not complete and regular.8
AGREEMENTS FOR EXTENSION
Contracts for the extension of the time of payment may
present questions as'to the certainty of maturity required for ne-
gotiability. More commonly, however, the problem raised has to
do with the effect upon the parties secondarily liable or the ef-
fectiveness of the agreement as between the parties, and these
matters will be considered in other connections. An agreement
for extension, however clearly binding it may be, made outside
the instrument, either before or after maturity, cannot, it seems,
have any possible effect upon the negotiability of the paper.
That must be determined from the language in the written in-
strument.
In a leading case 9 it was held that an instrument was not a
negotiable note because it contained a provision that: "The mak-
ers and indorsers of this obligation further expressly agree that
the payee, or his assigns, may extend the time of payment thereof
from time to time indefinitely as he or they may see fit." In view
of the fact that the maker, the payee, and the first indorser were
the same person it is perhaps not surprising that the court con-
cluded that: "By the terms of the condition of the note in suit it
would never fall due, but could be indefinitely extended." The
chances are, however, that the quoted provision was in a printed
form and not at all intended to have the effect attributed to it.
In a later case in the same state 10 a stipulation that: "Sureties
hereby consent that time of payment may be extended from time
to time without notice thereof" was held not to prejudice nego-
'As pointed out in the note in (1922) 22 Coi. L. Rav. I59, the objection to
the bill, whatever there was, should not have been put on the ground that there
was any incompleteness or irregularity, but rather that it was not a good bill
because of lack of the requisite certainty as to time of maturity. If the meaning
of the language was clear, as it is submitted it was, then there was no incom-
pleteness or irregularity; if, on the other hand, any first of December might
have been the fair meaning, then the instrument was lacking in a fundamental
requisite of a good bill, and hence non-negotiable.
'Woodbury v. Roberts, 59 Iowa 348, 13 N. W. 312 (1882).
"°Farmer v. Bank of Graettinger, i3o Iowa 469, io7 N. W. i7o (19o6).
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tiability.11 Under these decisions the controlling question is
whether the extension provision amounts to an agreement pres-
ently to extend for an unstated and undeterminable time, or an
agreement in advance by either the principal debtor or the holder
to consent to such indefinite extension if proposed by the other,
or, on the other hand, in effect a mere waiver by parties sec-
ondarily liable of defenses upon which they might otherwise
rely if a binding extension were agreed upon by the principal
parties.'
2
The line of distinction just stated seems entirely sound,
the only real difficulty being that of determination of the fair
meaning of the language in the extension provision. Surely an
agreement by the holder that the maker may at his option post-
pone the time of payment for an indefinite or unstated period
renders the time for payment hopelessly uncertain; an agreement
by the maker that the payee should have such privilege also leaves
the ultimate date for payment uncertain.'
3
A provision that sureties or indorsers agree to be liable
without notice despite an extension of time clearly should not be
interpreted as affecting the time oi maturity.' 4 Agreements or con-
' The court, after observing that if an instrument provides in terms for
extension of time of payment indefinitely it is non-negotiable because of the
resulting uncertainty of time of maturity, pointed out that in the note in suit
there was an unqualified agreement on the part of the makers to pay on a cer-
tain date. The clause in question was accordingly held to be merely an agree-
ment by the sureties, if there were any, that they would not claim a release if,
forsooth, an extension should be granted the makers without notice to the
sureties.
"Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Weber, i8o Iowa 966, 164 N. W. 233 (1917),
L. R. A. 1iS8A 432 (in which, "All parties to this note, including sureties,
endorsers and guarantors" consented in advance to extensions of time) ; Quinn
v. Bane, 182 Iowa 843, 164 N. W. 788 (1918) ; Farmers' Nat Bank v. Stanton,
x91 Iowa 433, 182 N. W. 647 (1921); Security Say. Bank v. Capp, 193 Iowa
278, 186 N. W. 927 (1922).
" Here, however, some argument might be made that the instrument is in
effect payable at a definite time or thereafter on demand, thus possibly saving
the negotiability of the document. City Nat. Bank v. Goodloe-McClelland Com.
Co., 93 Mo. App. 123 (igo) ; Capron v. Capron, 44 Vt. 410 (1872).
u Wolfboro L. & B. Co. v. Rollins, 195 Mass. 323, 81 N. E. 204 (i9o7);
American Bank & T. Co. v. Ragsdale, 74 Ind. App. 367, 129 N. E. 59 (1920)
(distinguishing situations in which the language is to the effect that payment
may be extended by the payee or any subsequent holder of the note) ; Wittey v.
Mich. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 123 Ind. 411, 24 N. E. 141 (i89o); Farmer v.
Bank of Graettinger, supra note io; Smith v. Nelson Land & Cattle Co., 212
Fed. 56 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); McDonald v. Mulkey, 32 Wyo. 144, 231 Pac.
662 (1924).
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sents to extensions to which principal debtors are in terms parties,
thus possibly to be distinguished from those just mentioned, will
of course vary in phraseology. Usually they are tied up with
waivers of presentment, demand, notice and protest.15 In this
form, and further in view of the fact that almost always the
language is found in a printed form of note, it seems a distorted
construction that th time of payment, otherwise sufficiently defi-
nite, is thereby rendered uncertain. 16 While there is respectable
authority that an instrument with such provision is indefinite as
to maturity, hence non-negotiable,' 7 by far the larger number of
cases, and, it is believed, much the better opinion is that there
is no effect upon maturity.'18 Under this preferable view there
is no extension of time unless later agreed to by the parties com-
petent to make such contract, and the force of the extension pro-
vision, as indicated by its position in connection with the waiver
'In a recent case the language in question was: "the makers, indorsers, and
guarantors of this note, and the sureties hereon, severally waive presentment for
payment, protest and notice of dishonor, and consent that the time of its pay-
ment may be extended without notice, all defenses on the ground of any exten-
sion of time of payment being hereby expressly waived." Security Nat. Bank v.
Gunderson, 216 N. W. 595 (S. D. i927).
' Another instance of troubles arising out of the use of a printed form not
adapted to the intended use is McReynolds v. Mortgage & Acceptance Corp.,
13 F. (2d) 313 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1926). Here, however, the difficulty had
nothing to do with waivers.
"Sanderson v. Clark, 33 Idaho 359, 194 Pac. 472 (ig2o); Cedar Rapids
Nat. Bank v. Weber, i8o Iowa 966, 164 N. W. 233 (917) ; Security Say. Bank
v. Capp, i93 Iowa 278, i86 N. W. 927 (1922) ; Rossville State Bank v. Heslet,
84 Kan. 315, 113 Pac. 1052, 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 738 (1911) ; Central Nat. Bank
v. Engler, r12 Kan. 7o8,-212 Pac. 656 (923) ; see Notes (1g18) 3 CoRNq. L. Q.
125; (918) 4 IOWA L. BULL. 123.
a'Anaheim Nat. Bank v. Dolph, 255 Pac. 184 (Cal. 1927); Longmont Nat.
Bank v. Loukonen, 53 Colo. 489, 127 Pac. 947 (1912), Ann. Cas. 1914B 2o8;
Bonart v. Rabito, 141 La. 970, 76 So. 166 (1917); City Nat. Bank v. Goodloe-
McClelland Com. Co., supra note 13; Russell v. Wyant, 214 Mo. App. 377, 253
S. W. 790 (1923); First Nat. Bank of Sidney v. Baldwin, ioo Neb. 25, I58
N. W. 371 (1916); First Nat. Bank v. Stover, 21 N. M. 453, 155 Pac. 9o5
(1915), Ann. Cas. 19i8B 145, L. R. A. Igi6D 128o; First Nat. Bank v. Buttery,
17 N. D. 326, 116 N. W. 341, 16 L. R. A. (N. s.) 878 (19o8) ; City Nat. Bank v.
Kelly, 51 Okla. 445, I51 Pac. 1172 (915) ; Security Nat. Bank v. Gunderson,
216 N. W. 595 (S. D. 1927); National Bank of Commerce v. Kenney, 98 Tex.
293, 83 S. W. 368 (904); McCornick v. Nielson, 64 Utah 6o5, 233 Pac. 122
(1925) ; Note (1923) 21 MIcH. L. REV. 927.
In Anaheim Nat. Bank v. Dolph, supra, at 187, the court said: "The appel-
lant concedes that the interpretation we place upon the language of the note in
question is in harmony with the modem doctrine on the subject, but insists that
the older cases are in a majority and better reasoned. The trend of modem
authority is unquestionably opposed to the appellant's construction of the note.
We are satisfied with the reasoning in these later cases."
TIME CERTAINTY IN NEGOTIABLE PAPER
of steps the omission of which would otherwise give a defense,
is merely to prevent those whose agreement it is from seeking to
escape liability because of the extension. If it be said that then
there is no need for including "makers" and others liable as prin-
cipal debtors, the answer seems effective that they are included
in terms out of an abundance of caution in preparation of the
form note, not infrequently a party who really is merely a surety
appearing on the instrument to be a maker. Occasionally the
language is in terms an authorization to or agreement with the
payee or other holder that he may extend the time for payment.
This would seem to be merely another way of expressing the
same idea, and the decisions are also in conflict here. 9 If it is
provided that no extension shall operate to release the signers
from liability, that would seem to be an even clearer case that the
time of payment is not rendered uncertain. This difference in
expression, however, has not been considered sufficient reason for
departing from the rule announced in cases involving the more
common provision.
20
An agreement for extension for a definite time is unobjec-
tionable to negotiability, even though it be looked upon as bind-
ing between the principal debtor and the holder, and not merely
as a foreclosure of possible defenses by those who might other-
wise be released from liability by an extension. Emphasis here
is placed upon the fact that there is a definite, ultimate date beyond
which, according to the terms of the instrument, payment cannot
be delayed.
2 1
"For cases holding that negotiability is not impaired see Stitzel v. Miller,
250 II1. 72, 95 N. E. 53, 34 L. R. A. (r. s.) 1oo4 (191I) ;Bank of Whitehouse
v. White, 136 Tenn. 634, 191 S. W. 332 (1917). Contra: Rosenthal v. Rainbo,'
165 Ind. 584, 76 N. E. 404 (1905) ; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Stanton, supra note
12; Smith v. Van Blarcom, 45 Mich. 371, 8 N. W. 9o (1881) ; Coffin v. Spencer,
39 Fed. 262 (C. C. Ind. z88o). In the Illinois case emphasis was placed on the
fact that the time might be extended only after maturity. See also Navajo
County Bank v. Dolson, 163 Cal. 485, 126 Pac. 153 (1912).
' Smith v. Zabel, 157 N. E. 551 (Ind. App. 1927), discussed in (1928)
26 MicH. L. Ray. 568.
'Anniston Loan & Trust Co. v. Stickney, io8 Ala. 146, i9 So. 63, 31 L. R.
A. 234 (1896) ; State Bank v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136 N. W. 204 (I912). In
both of these cases, although the extended period was definitely stated, there
was an uncertainty as to whether there ever would be an extension. In the first
case the extension for six months was optional with the makers and indorsers;
in the second it was dependent upon a designated tract of land not producing a
crop of a stated quantity. Perhaps the decisions may rest upon the view that
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"AT A FIXED PERIOD AFTER DATE OR SIGHT"
Much that has been said above is applicable here. Evidently
this language was put into the statute to make clear that an in-
strument may be negotiable although the maturity date necessi-
tates computation. A note dated March I, 1928, and expressed to
be payable "four months after date" is as acceptable as one in
which the maturity date is stated to be "July I, 1928." The &om-
putation may be more complicated. For example, a promise to
pay $500 in equal monthly installments of $ioo each certainly
provides for payment at a fixed period after date. So also an
agreement to pay £170 with interest at a stated rate, "The first
payment, to wit, £4o or more to be made on the Ist Feb. 1873, and
£5 on the first day of each month following until this note and
interest shall be fully satisfied." 22
By Section 6-I it is provided that the validity and negotiable
character of an instrument are not affected by the fact that it is
not dated. Section 13 furthei- declares that :"Where an instru-
ment expressed to be payable at a fixed period after date is issued
undated . . . any holder may insert therein the true date of
issue . ." These provisions seem to make it clear that an
undated -note, for example, payable sixty days after date, should
be, so far as the time element is concerned, deemed negotiable.
As to bills payable a certain time "after sight" it should be
observed that maturity is determined by taking as the start of
the stated period the date of acceptance or dishonor by refusal
to accept.23 Private exhibition of the bill to the drawee does not
start the period-"the sight," says Marius,24 "must appear in a
there were ultimate, fixed dates of maturity-the ends of the extension periods-
with provisions for accelerated maturity on the happening or non-happening of
certain contingencies. See infra p. 322.
If the agreement is for a renewal without stating the time during which the
renewed instrument is to run, the time of payment is indefinite. Citizens Nat.
Bank v. Piollet, 126 Pa. 194, 17 Atl. 603 (1889) ; cf. cases cited supra note 12.
In New Mexico an extension of time "until frost" was deemed to be for a defi-
nite time. West Texas Loan Co. v. Montgomery, 27 N. M. 296, 2oo Pac. 681
(1921). But the court was not passing upon the negotiability of the note.
'Cooke v. Horn, 29 L. T. N. S. 369 (1873). The case also presents the
problem of instruments payable at a determinable date or earlier at the option
of the maker. As to this point see infra, this section.
" Campbell v. French, 6 T. R. 200 (795) ; Mitchell v. Degrand, Fed. Cas.
No. 9,661 (C. C. Mass. 1817) ; BYLEs, BiLLs (i8th ed. 1923) 78.
"BLs OF EXCHANGE (2d ed. 1790) 41.
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legal way, which is approved either by the parties underwriting
the bill, accepting thereof, or by protest made for non-acceptance."
Statutory confirmation of this early "advice" seems to appear in
Section 143-1.
"ON OR BEFORE" PAPER
It is suprising that in subdivision 2 which is one of three sup-
posedly elucidating the meaning of "a determinable future time,"
it should be declared in effect that an instrument is payable at a
determinable future time if it is payable on or before a determin-
able future time. In other words, the definitive statement makes
use of the very expression being defined.
Whatever may be the scope of the second subdivision, at least
it makes clear that the common promise to pay on or before a
date stated, or on or before a fixed period after date, is unob-
jectionable to negotiability. Thus the view that was infrequently
entertained before the statute that such promises were not definite
in point of time,25 has been repudiated.
26
=Hubbard v. Mosely, 77 Mass. 170 (1858); Way v. Smith, iii Mass. 523
(1873); Stults v. Silva, iu9 Mass. 137 (1875) ; Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass.
218, 6 N. E. 68 (1885) ; see Chouteau v. Allen, 70 MO. 290, 339 (1879). But cf.
First Nat. Bank v. Skeen, ioi Mo. 683, 14 S. W. 732 (189o) ; Fogg. v. School
Dist., 75 Mo. App. 159 (1898). The notion in Massachusetts that an "on or be-
fore" promise was fatal to a negotiable note, indeed to any promissory note, nego-
tiable or not, seems to begin with the case first cited. It was not noticed that the
instrument there in question was deemed not a negotiable note largely, if not
entirely, because of a provision, in form a condition, that the note was to be
given up to the maker "as soon as" the face amount thereof was received by the
payee. Bigelow, J., pointed out, at 172, that the holder could not count upon
his right to receive the money at all events, for a payment even before maturity
to the payee would have been a good discharge of the contract, "although it had
then been passed over to a third person, if the promisor had no notice of such
transfer."
In Lowell Trust Co. v. Pratt, 183 Mass. 379, 67 N. E. 363 (1903), a note
payable five years from date was held negotiable despite added language giving
the makers the privilege of paying the whole or any portion of the principal sum
"at any time within said five years if they so desire." This result was due to a
statute, Mass. Laws 1888, c. 329, declaring that: "No written promise to pay
money shall be held not to be a promissory note, or not to be negotiable for the
reason that the time of payment is uncertain, provided that the money is payable
at all events and at some time that must certainly come." Strangely, this statute
and the last cited case escaped the court's attention in Pierce v. Talbot, 213
Mass. 330, ioo N. E. 553 (19Q13), reliance being placed upon Stults v. Silva,
supra, in holding non-negotiable an instrument that permitted payment by antici-
pation at any time.
'"Road Imp. Dist. v. Bank of Commerce, 169 Ark. 43, 272 S. W. 834 (1925).
In Utah State Nat. Bank v. Smith, i8o Cal. i, i79 Pac. i6o (igIg), the court
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ACCELERATED MATURITY
When an instrument contains a fixed or determinable future
time of maturity, the variety of provisions that may be incor-
porated therein maturing the paper earlier is wide indeed. Such
provisions, however, may be classified along at least two lines
which cross: (a) according to the relationship of the accelerating
event to the instrument, and (b) according to the relationship be-
tween the event and the holder or maker. Under (a) there may
be accelerating events: (I) having some bearing upon the obliga-
tion evidenced by the instrument or its collection, and (2) having
no such bearing. A learned writer in the field of negotiable paper
has suggested that acceleration of maturity should be possible
"only by the performance of an act regularly incident to the col-
lection of the paper." 27 .The demand in instruments payable on
demand, and presentment in paper payable at or after sight, are
typical of the acts "regularly incident to the collection of the
paper." The cases decided under the N. I. L., however, fall far
short of being classifiable according to this test. There are many
cases denying negotiability because of the acceleration provision,
although it involved an act incidental to collection, and not a
few decisions upholding negotiability although the accelerating
event did not involve such an act. But there is no test according
to which a line may be drawn differentiating the holdings. The
uncertainty in the law is pronounced and disconcerting. Brief
was of opinion that § 4-2 of the N. I. L. covered not only those promises in
terms payable "on or before" but many other types. In Union State Bank v.
Benson, 38 N. D. 396, 165 N. W. 509 (917), a note payable "on or before Sept.
2, i9io," was held negotiable, most of the discussion in the case, however, being
devoted to the effect which marginal notations that certain partial payments
would be made at certain dates had upon the note being deemed dishonored after
those dates had passed without the payments.
A curious question arose in Delaney v. Nelson, 132 Wash. 772, 232 Pac.
292 (1925). The note involved was an "on or before" one, interest payable
annually, and with the further provision that "The sum of one hundred dollars
or any multiple thereof, of the principal sum of this note, may be paid at any
date on which interest is payable under the terms hereof." The court was of
opinion that under these terms the maker could pay all the note at any time
before the due date, but could pay part of it only on interest-paying dates, pro-
viding such payments were of Sioo or any multiple thereof.
' Chafee, supra note 3, at 756. This is, as Professor Chafee states, an
adoption of the doctrine laid down in 2 AmEs, CAsEs oN BILLS AND NomXs
(1894) 831.
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reference to several common types of documents may indicate
some of the troubles.
In several cases it has been held that there was an objection-
able uncertainty as to maturity because of a provision that the
holder might at any time declare the entire sum due and payable
if he felt himself insecure. 28  This seems in substance the same as
stating the maturity to be at a fixed date or earlier if demanded,
as to which, before the N. L L., there were conflicting views.29
There are decisions both ways as to the negotiability of paper
providing, inter alia, that if the collateral given as security de-
preciates in value the debtor shall on demand deliver additional
collateral to the holder's satisfaction and in default thereof that
the entire sum shall mature at once.30 So also in the case of the
'First Nat. Bank v. McCartan, 220 N. W. 364 (Iowa 1928); Old Colony
Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 126 Misc. 375, 213 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1926); First
State Bank v. Barton, 129 Okla. 67, 263 Pac. 142 (1928); Puget Sound
State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870 (1917).
See also Murrell v. Exchange Bank, 168 Ark. 645, 271 S. W. 21 (1925), where-
the note was given for the price of a chattel, the holder to be allowed to accel-
erate maturity, as the court interpreted the language, whenever he deemed the
property, for the price of which the note was given, to be unsafe. This was
deemed to fall within the "insecurity" cases. In the Stumpel case, supra, the
court says, at 379, 213 N. Y. Supp. at 539, that: "In no reported case has a
clause, accelerating maturity if the holder deems himself insecure been held
negotiable . . . "
In the New York case the test proposed by Ames and Chafee as to accelera-
tion by the performance of an act regularly incident to the paper's collection is
somehow thought to lead to the conclusion announced, that the instrument was
non-negotiable. If the court had read a little further, it would have observed
that in Professor Chafee's opinion these "insecurity" clauses are clearly per-
missible. Chafee, supra note 3, at 773-776. Reference was also made to the
well-worn, picturesque though misleading, figure of Chief Justice Gibson in
Overton v. Tyler, 3 Pa. 346 (1846), of a negotiable instrument being "a courier
without luggage." This suggests an entirely different ground of objection, hav-
ing nothing to do with uncertainty of time, and it is to be noted that even
under the more narrow test, the clause in question was not offensive luggage, its
function being to aid in the collection of the debt represented by the note. The
Oklahoma court travels the same ground, quoting from the Stumpel case.
If the note is payable on demand, then there is nothing objectionable in a
provision that if the holder at any time may feel himself insecure, he may apply
pledged collateral upon the indebtedness. Security Bank v. Foster, 249 S. W.
227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923).
'In Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass. 151 (1882), a note expressed to be
payable "on demand or in three years from this date," was held to be uncertain
as to time of payment. Contra: Louisville Banking Co. v. Gray, 123 Ala. 251,
26 So. 205 (1899).
0 That such notes are non-negotiable see Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman,
85 Kan. 71, z16 Pac. 239 (19,1), 35 L. R. A. (x. s.) 390 (1912) ; Hibernia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Dresser, 132 La. 532, 61 So. 561 (1913) (apparently over-
ruled by Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank v. Warner, 145 La. 1022, 83 So. 228
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common "chattel note" in which the payee-vendor frequently re-
serves title l and is authorized to sue at once and, perhaps, to
seize the chattel if the buyer-maker attempts to sell it, or to re-
move it permanently from the state, or suffers it to be taken by
a third party on legal process. The force of the cases holding
such paper non-negotiable on the basis of uncertainty of time
3 2
has been much weakened. If the acceleration is dependent upon
some act or default of the debtor, it seems to be the better opin-
ion that there is no offensive time uncertainty,3" the cases under
this head thus being generally in accord in result with those in-
[1919]); Reynolds v. Vint, 73 Ore. 528, 144 Pac. 526 (1914); Greenwood v.
Kirby, 24 Manitoba L. R. 532, 2o D. L. R. 725 (1914) (under Canadian Bills of
Exchange Act). The better and more commonly entertained opinion, however,
is to the contrary. Finley v. Smith, 165 Ky. 445, 177 S. W. 262, L. R. A. 1915F
777 (1915); Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank v. Warner, supra; Empire Nat.
Bank v. High Grade Oil Refining Co., 26o Pa. 255, 103 Atl. 6o2 (i918) ; West
Point Banking Co. v. Gaunt, i5o Tenn. 74, 262 S. W. 38 (1924), 34 A. L. R.
862 (1925) ; Kennedy v. Broderick, 216 Fed. 137 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914) ; Kobey
y. Hoffman, 229 Fed. 486 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916). In the case last cited the action
was on the same notes held non-negotiable by the Kansas court in the Holliday
State Bank case, supra. The federal court concluded that the Kansas decision
was not in accordance with the law merchant, which on this point became statu-
tory law by the N. I. L.
The force of the first group of cases is further weakened by the fact that
the conclusions therein are based fully as much upon the ground that the instru-
ments contained additional undertakings beyond the requisite simplicity of nego-
tiable paper, as upon the ground of indefiniteness of time of maturity. The
North Carolina statute provides elaborately for the negotiability of paper with
provisions for acceleration upon failure to put up additional collateral, extension
of time, etc. N. C. Laws 1923, c. 72. See also Wisconsin statutes.
' This feature as rendering the paper conditional has been considered in
connection with the discussion of conditions. See Aigler, supra note 4, at 477.
'Kimpton v. Studebaker Bros. Co., 14 Idaho 552, 94 Pac. 1039 (i9o8);
Moyer v. Hyde, 35 Idaho 16l, 204 Pac. io68 (1922), 28 A. L. R. 695 (1924);
Iowa Nat. Bank v. Carter, 144 Iowa 715, 123 N. W. 237 (19o9); First Nat.
Bank v. Carson, 6o Mich. 432 (1886) ; Reynolds v. Vint, supra note 30; Carroll,
etc., Bank v. Strother, 28 S. C. 5o4, 6 S. E. 313 (1888) ; Kimball Co. v. Mellon,
8o Wis. 133, 48 N. W. iioo (i891) ; see United Bank & Tr. Co. v. McCullough,
212 N. W. 762, 764 (Neb. 1927) ; cf. Utah State Nat. Bank v. Smith, 18o Cal. i,
179 Pac. i6o (I919).
' McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil & Products Co., 38 Idaho 470, 222
Pac. 286 (1923), 34 A. L. R. 867 (1925); Des Moines Say. Bank v. Arthur,
163 Iowa 2o5, 143 N. W. 556 (1913) ; Bonart v. Rabito, supra note I8; Schmidt
v. Pegg, 172 Mich. 159, 137 N. W. 524 (1912); Nickell v. Bradshaw, 94 Ore.
58o, 183 Pac. 12 (I919), ii A. L. R. 623 (1921). In the McCornick case the
earlier Idaho cases, cited above, were distinguished on the ground that the notes
there involved allowed the holder to accelerate maturity at his own whim, while
in the present case he could exercise such option only upon the debtor's default
or upon the happening of an event outside of the control of either. This point
was made also in Nickell v. Bradshaw, and in Des Moines Say. Bank v. Arthur,
both supra.
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volving acceleration whenever the holder may deem himself in-
secure.
Before the N. I. L. there was a conflict of authority as to
whether a warrant of attorney to confess judgment made the in-
strument of which it was a part non-negotiable. The courts hold-
ing that such paper was not negotiable relied on two grounds,
namely: (i) the provision was "luggage" beyond that permitted
in a negotiable instrument, 34 and (2) the time of maturity was
thereby made uncertain.- Obviously the latter ground could
apply only when the confession was authorized before the in-
strument otherwise matured. The first of these two grounds, at
least as to warrants to confess judgments if not paid at maturity,
no longer can apply,36 for it is now expressly provided by the
statute 37 that negotiability is not affected by a provision which
"authorized a confession of judgment if the instrument be not
paid at maturity." 38 Since this language is found in the section
purporting to cover the "luggage" situation it is open to question
whether it ought to be considered to have any bearing upon the
time element. This point would have to be faced if it were argued
that the language quoted from the statute had changed the law in
a state in which theretofore a warrant to confess judgment at any
time had been deemed consistent with negotiability. 39 However
it may be with instruments allowing confessions of judgment at
I This was the ground mainly relied upon in the famous case of Overton v.
Tyler, supra note 28, in which Chief Justice Gibson gave currency to the unfor-
tunate expression "a courier without luggage." Seipp Brewing Co. v. McKit-
trick, 86 Mich. I9I, 48 N. WN. io86 (i8gi).
a Richards v. Barlow, 140 Mass. 218, 6 N. E. 68 (1885), in which Holmes,
J., said that the case was governed by Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass. 151
(1882), where the note was payable "on demand or in three years from this
date."
In Iowa, provisions for confession of judgment had no effect upon nego-
tiability because they were void. Tolman v. Janson, io6 Iowa 455, 76 N. W.
732 (1898) ; Green v. Dick & Shope, 72 Pa. Super. 266 (i919).
nN. I. L. § 5-2.
N. I. L. § 5-2. The Illinois version of the N. I. L. omits the words "if
the instrument be not paid at maturity."
"In Gehlbach v. Carlinville Nat. Bank, 83 Ill. App. 129 (1898), the note in
suit was held negotiable although judgment was authorized to be confessed at
any time whether or not the note was then due. But the variation in the statu-
tory language in that state, supra note 38, made it unnecessary for the Illinois
courts to decide the question raised.
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or after maturity, 40 the disposition of the courts seems to be
clearly to view paper in which judgments may be confessed prior
to maturity at the election of the holder as non-negotiable.
4 1
With these confession of judgment decisions in mind, it
might be expected that a note or bond payable at a fixed date,
but authorizing the holder, prior to maturity, to convert the
instrument into stock, for example, would be held non-nego-
tiable. Authority of the highest character, however, upholds the
negotiability of such paper.
42
It is a strange line of distinction that has been more and
more definitely drawn by the courts as to the possible effect upon
negotiability of acceleration provisions depending upon the
location of control of the accelerating event. If the happen-
ing of the event rests with the maker,43 whether an election there-
'Metropolitan Bank v. McNutt, 73 Colo. 291, 215 Pac. I51 (923) ; New-
hall Say. Bank v. Buck, 197 Iowa 732, 197 N. W. 986 (1924) ; Edelen v. Bank,
r39 Md. 413, 15 Atl. 599 (i92i) ; McDonald v. Mulkey, 32 Wyo. 144, 231 Pac.
662 (1924).
"johnson v. Phillips, 143 Md. I6, 122 Atl. 7 (1923) ; Miners' State Bank v.
Auksztokalnis, 283 Pa. 18, 128 Atl. 726 (1925) ; -First Nat. Bank v. Russell, 124
Tenn. 618, 139 S. W. 734 (I911); Wisconsin Yearly Meeting, etc. v. Babler,
115 Wis. 289, 91 N. W. 678 (i9o2) ; Clark v. Bank, I7I Wis. 133, 176 N. W. 906
(1920); Muender v. Muender, 182 Wis. 417, 196 N. W. 773 (1924). In Edelen
v. Bank, supra note 4o, confession of judgment was authorized "at any time"
but "for such sum as may be due." This was held to authorize a- confession
only after maturity. In McDonald v. Mulkey, supra note 40, the same conclu-
sion was reached on language allowing confession "for the amount due thereon
* . . at any time after date hereof or after maturity." The result would be
otherwise if judgment could be confessed "for such amount as may appear to
be unpaid." Seipp Brewing Co. v. McKittrick, mpra note 34. If confession is
authorized "after maturity," it is not necessary to add the words "if not paid."
Metropolitan Bank v. McNutt, supra note 40. As to the effect upon the status
of the instrument of entering the authorized judgment, see Chafee, supra note
3, at 772, 773.
'Hotchkiss v. National Banks, 21 Wall. 354 (U. S. 1874); Hodges v.
Shuler, 22 N. Y. 114 (186o); Welch v. Sage, 47 N. Y. 143 (1872); Denney v.
R. R., 28 Ohio St. io8 (0875) semnble.
There are many acts or defaults on the maker's part on which maturity
may be accelerated. Those stated in the trade acceptance involved in McCornick
& Co. v. Gem State Oil & Products Co., supra note 33, were suspension of pay-
ment, giving a chattel mortgage, disposing of his business, and failing to meet
at maturity any prior trade acceptance. In chattel notes maturity may be accel-
erated upon the maker-buyer removing the chattel from the state, or upon
attachments being levied on the property, etc. By far the most common sort
of hastened maturity along this line depends upon a failure by the maker to do
some agreed act such as the payment of taxes, insurance, interest or an install-
ment. These seem to be uniformly held acceptable. McCormick v. Daggett,
162 Ark. I6, 257 S. W. 358 (1924) ; Hutson v. Rankin, 36 Idaho i69, 213 Pac.
345 (1922) ; Hubbard v. Wallace Co., 201 Iowa 1143, 2o8 N. W. 73o (1926) ;
Commerce Trust Co. v. Guarantee T. & T. Co., 113 Kan. 311, 214 Pac. 6Io
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after by the holder is or is not prerequisite to maturity, there
seems now no disposition to find the provision offensive to
(1923); Farmers' B. & T. Co. v. Dent, 209 Ky. 405, 267 S. W. 202 (1924) ;
Star Brewing Co. v. Higgins, 248 Mass. 480, 143 N. E. 332 (1924) ; Durham v.
Rasco, 30 N. M. 16, 227 Pac. 599 (1924); Walter v. Kilpatrick, 191 N. C. 458,
132 S. E. 148 (1926). Indeed, as to interest and installments it is declared in
§ 2-3 that: "The sum payable is a sum certain . . . although it is to be paid
. . . by stated installments, with a provision that upon default in payment of
any installment or of interest the whole shall become due." But this has to do
with certainty of amount, not of time.
Although there is little occasion to question the negotiability of instruments
because of the presence of provisions for maturity upon failure to pay interest
or an installment when due, there are other questions of possible difficulty aris-
ing out of such agreements that in this connection can be alluded to but briefly.
The acceleration stipulation may be found only in another related document
such as the securing mortgage. Courts have differed as to whether in such
case the accelerated maturity permits action only on the other document, or
whether proceedings may be based upon the note or notes as well. Durham
v. Rasco, supra; Winne v. Lahart, i55 Minn. 307, 193 N. W. 587 (1923). Many
cases are collected ana classified in Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 848-861 and Note
(1928) 26 MICH. L. REV. 437. The view that the note is matured is based upon
the unsound doctrine that the note and mortgage, for example, being contem-
poraneously executed and relating to the same transaction, are to be construed
together, the terms of one to be read into and as part of the other. See Aigler.
supra note 4, at 491. If the note contains language incorporating by reference
the terms of the other document, then clearly the note may be matured for all
purposes.
In various ways, as the running of the statute of limitations, the taking of
proper steps to fix the liability of secondary parties, the status of subsequent
purchasers of the instrument as possible holders in due course, etc., it is impor-
tant to know whether the acceleration is effected automatically by the default,
or whether there must be an election by the holder to treat the whole amount
as due. It is conceivable, though unlikely, that it may be specifically stated in
substance that upon default there shall be an automatic maturity. On the other
hand, it may be, and such is commonly the case, that the accelerated maturity is
definitely declared to be at the option of the holder. In these instances the
result seems free of doubt. The difficulty comes when there is no clear-cut
statement either way, either that the hastened maturity is automatic or that it
is optional. Largely influenced by an early Kansas decision, the opinion being
by a very distinguished Judge (Brewer), there has been considerable following
for the doctrine that this last type of acceleration agreement is as much for the
benefit of the debtor as for the creditor. In that case, National Bank v. Peck, 8
Kan. 66o, 663 (1871), it was said that: "This clause is inserted in mortgages
usually for the benefit of the mortgagee; but being a valid stipulation the mort-
gagor has equal right to insist upon it, and receive whatever advantage he can
from its enforcement. When the payer at the expiration of six months failed
to pay the note then due, by the terms of the contract all three notes became
due. The statute of limitations began to run on all, and a subsequent purchaser
purchased after maturity." Examine Perkins v. Swain, 35 Idaho 485, 207 Pac.
585 (1922), 34 A. L. R. 894 (1925); Miles v. Hamilton, lo6 Kan. 804, 189 Pac.
926 (192o), i A. L. R. 276 (1922); Cedar Rapids Nat. Bank v. Snoozy, 55
N. D. 655, :i15 N. W. 96 (1927) ; McCray Refrigerator Co. v. Simms, 268 S. W.
275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925); Hodge v. Wallace, 129 Wis. 84. io8 N. W. 212
(19o6) ; Reeves v. Butcher, [1891] 2 Q. B. 509. The better opinion is that these
acceleration provisions are not self-operative. McCormick v. Daggett, supra;
Putthoff v. Walker, 213 Mo. App. 228, 248 S. W. 619 (1923); Walter v. Kil-
patrick, supra; Core v. Smith, 23 Okla. 909, 102 Pac. 114 (1gog); Hartge v.
Capeloto, 136 Wash. 538, 241 Pac. 5 (1925); Keene Five Cent Say. Bank v.
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negotiability. 44 When the acceleration is at the uncontrolled option
or caprice of the holder the strong current of authority is against
the negotiability of the paper. 45 An accelerating event the hap-
pening of which rests with neither maker nor holder is more com-
monly found unobjectionble, 46 although there is authority to the
contrary. T
When it is recalled that the primary reasons for time cer-
tainty in negotiable paper are the affording of data for valuation of
the instrument in terms of money, the making of presentment and
demand of payment at the right time, and the giving of proper
notices to parties secondarily liable, all problems for the holder,
it is astonishing that the type of acceleration provision causing
Reid, 123 Fed. 221 (C. C. A. 8th, 19o3) ; Gillette v. Hodge, 17o Fed. 313 (C. C.
A. 8th, igo) ; Chicago R. Equipment Co. v. Bank, 136 U. S. 268, 284 (1889).
As to whether acceleration which is concluded to be optional requires pre-
sentment, see Griffin v. Reilly, 275 S. W. 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 925) ; Hartge
v. Capeloto, supra. As to what amounts to an election to mature the debt, see
Harrison v. Beals, iii Ore. 563, 222 Pac. 728 (1924) ; City Nat. Bank v. Pope,
26o S. W. 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924). An optional acceleration may be
waived. California S. & L. Soc. v. Culver, 127 Cal. IO7, 59 Pac. 292 (1899);
McRae v. Federal Land Bank, 36 Ga. App. 51, 135 S. E. 112 (1926); see Con-
sole v. Torchinsky, 97 Conn. 353, 355, II6 Atl. 613 (1922). But if the accelera-
tion is automatic, see Miles v. Hamilton, supra.
"Section 2-3 provides that an instrument calls for a sum certain within the
meaning of the N. I. L. although it is to be paid: "By stated installments, with
a provision that upon default in payment of any installment or of interest the
whole shall become due." This section has nothing to do with the element of
time certainty, but it sheds light upon the legislative intent as to the status of
paper with acceleration provisions. Although in Iowa the words "or of inter-
est" are omitted from the statute, it was held that a note payable in one amount
at the due date, but providing for earlier maturity on default in payment of
interest, was negotiable, such being the law merchant. Commercial Say. Bank
v. Schaffer, 19o Iowa io88, I8I N. W. 492 (921).
' See the cases cited supra notes 28 and 39.
6 McCornick & Co. v. Gem State Oil & Products Co., supra note 33; Hal-
stad State Bank v. Bilstad, 162 Iowa 433, 136 N. W. 204 (1912), modified, 144
N. W. 363 (913), 49 L. R. A. (N. S.) 132 (914); Bonart v. Rabito, supra note
i8; Schmidt v. Regg, 172 Mich. 159, 137 N. W. 524 (1912) ; Nickell v. Bradshaw,
94 Ore. 58o, 183 Pac. 12 (I919), ii A. L. R. 623 (1921). Among the more
commonly cited cases to the same effect decided before the N. I. L. are Walker
v. Woolen, 54 Ind. 164 (1876); Charlton v. Reed, 61 Iowa 166, 6 N. W. 64
(1883) ; Palmer v. Hummer, io Kan. 464 (1872) ; Ernst v. Steckman, 74 Pa. 13
(0873).
"TGreat Falls Nat. Bank v. Young, 67 Mont. 328, 215 Pac. 651 (923).
See also Alexander v. Thomas, i6 Q. B. 333 (I85I), where an instrument call-
ing for payment ninety days after sight "or when realized," was not a good bill
even though interpreted as payable at all events at the end of the ninety days.
The court emphasized the difficulty of the holder if he were to make present-
ment at the right time. Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 Mich. 254 (187o), is similar,
the promise being to pay in one year or whenever dividends on certain stock
were declared.
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least difficulty along these lines to him should be the one so gen-
erally condemned. In the instances in which the control of the
accelerating event is in the maker there is normally some act or
default on his part which almost necessarily becomes known to
the holder; hence, while there may be difficulty in placing an ac-
curate valuation upon the instrument, there is not likely to be
any hardship so far as reasonable presentment and notice are
concerned.
Why there should be so much objection to paper maturing
at a fixed date or earlier at the uncontrolled option of the holder
is difficult to understand. It must, of course, be granted that there
is an uncertainty as to the maturity of such documents. But so
there is in all demand instruments, and their negotiability is con-
ceded. Why a note that is payable on demand for three years,
for example, and then, if not earlier demanded, becomes due and
payable according to its own terms, should not be classed as nego-
tiable, while one payable at any time on demand is negotiable, has
never been explained. The courts content themselves with re-
peating over and over again, in substance, that an acceleration
provision which may operate at the whim or caprice 48 of the
holder renders the instrument uncertain as to time of maturity.
It is sometimes pointed out that in such instances the money is
payable neither on demand nor at a fixed or determinable future
time, as required by the first section of the N. I. L.,49 and there-
fore cannot be negotiable. This means paying no attention what-
ever to Section 4-2, under which instruments payable "on or
before a fixed or determinable future time" are clearly nego-
tiable. If any paper with a fixed maturity and an acceleration
provision is negotiable under the N. I. L., it must be because it
comes within the language just quoted. Certainly there is nothing
therein indicating a differentiation between the various sorts of
acceleration clauses. It may very reasonably be contended that
'3 If the objection is on the ground that the holder may oppress the maker
by a capricious call for the money, it would seem that not merely negotiability
but the very validity of the instrument would be endangered. Besides, in de-
mand paper the danger of oppression is fully as great.
" See, for example, Kimpton v. Studebaker Bros. Co., supra note 32, at 559,
94 Pac. at io4i.
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if any are good, they all are; that is, of course, providing there is
a date when the paper must certainly mature.
The very worst type of acceleration agreement would seem
to be that dependent upon the happening or non-happening of a
stated event not within the control of either maker or holder. For
example, suppose a note were made payable at a fixed time or
earlier "if ranch is sold or mortgaged," or "one year earlier if
crop on designated land exceeds so many bushels per acre," or
"to become at once due and payable if any attachment is levied"
upon certain goods.50 If maturity must involve "the performance
of an act regularly incident to the collection of the paper," 51 then
surely these decisions are wrong, and a few cases so hold.52  It
must be repeated, however, that there is nothing in the statute
warranting any such line of distinction.
Determination of the money equivalent of paper of this
last type is no more difficult or uncertain than in the case of in-
struments payable "on or before," at the maker's option. In
neither case has the holder any control over the acceleration, and
the chances of earlier payment or maturity are, as to him, wholly
speculative. If, however, the holder must make presentment,
demand, and give notice in accordance with such accelerated ma-
turity, he does indeed have a difficult duty to perform. 53  The
problem of the subsequent purchaser who claims to be a holder
in due course, which means that he must have taken before ma-
turity, is relatively simple. If he is ignorant of the happening of
the accelerating event, the maturity may well be taken to be the
fixed, ultimate date. 54  Of course there is the independent ques-
o See cases cited supra note 46.
' See Chafee, supra note 3, at 756, 773.
See cases cited supra note 47. Cases contra are cited supra note 46.
In Alexander v. Thomas, supra note 47, at 335, Lord Campbell said:
"Even, however, if the other is the right meaning, namely, that the bill is pay-
able sooner if the drawee should be sooner in funds, and, if not, at the end of
ninety days at all events, I think this would not be a good bill; for the holder
would have to watch and ascertain the precise time when the bill should become
payable, and, if he failed in doing this and in duly presenting it, the drawer
would be discharged. I am of opinion that this is not a good bill of exchange,
drawn according to the custom of merchants, so as to relieve the plaintiff from
the necessity of stating a consideration for it."
54 Dunn v. O'Keefe, 5 M. & S. 282 (1816); Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Bank,
66 Colo. 426, 182 Pac. 12 (I919), 5 A. L. R. 587 (1920) ; see also N. I. L. § 117.
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tion of the purchaser's good or bad faith, which may conceivably
involve a consideration of a possible earlier dishonor of the in-
strument.
It is the status of the holder at the time of the accelerated ma-
turity, then, that causes the real difficulty. If it is his duty to
give notice forthwith to parties secondarily liable, at the peril
of otherwise losing his hold upon them, he is in this respect,
as a practical matter, almost helpless; that is, if, as is assumed,
the acceleration operates automatically upon an event that would
ordinarily be outside his observation. By Section lO2 of the
statute it is declared that: "Notice must be given as soon as the
instrument is dishonored." It may be suggested with some reason
that whether or not an instrument should rank as a bill or note
should not turn upon even conceded difficulties of the holder,
growing out of the statute of limitations or in preserving the
financial backing of secondary parties. But it is submitted that
it does not necessarily follow that such parties are discharged
by the holder's failure to give notice promptly upon the accelerated
maturity unless, indeed, he then knew, or, in the exercise of
ordinary diligence and prudence, ought to have known of the dis-
honor. It is expressly provided 5s that: "Delay in giving notice
of dishonor is excused when the delay is caused by circumstances
beyond the control of the holder, and not imputable to his default,
misconduct, or negligence." 56
MATURITY AT TIME CERTAIN TO COME
In an early English case 57 a promise to pay A or order, "six
weeks after the death" of the promisor's father was held to be a
negotiable note within the Statute of Anne, for, as it is reported,
there was no contingency whereby the promise might never be-
come payable; the only uncertainty was as to time, "which is the
'N. I. L. § 113.
No case applying § 113 to this situation is known. As pointed out above,
there are a considerable number of cases upholding the negotiability of paper
such as that under consideration. It seems unlikely that, in the courts committed
to that view, it would be held that the secondary parties werc discharged by
failure of the holder to give notice at once upon the happening of the accelerat-
ing event It is -believed that this result may properly be brought within § 113.
' Cooke v. Colehan, 2 Strange 1217 (744).
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case of all bills payable at so many days after sight." At least
partially under the influence of this case it was decided,58 a few
years later, that a promise to pay upon receipt of A's wages "due
from his majesty's ship the Suffolk" was a negotiable note, since
the receipt of the wages, if not absolutely certain to come some-
time, as death is sure to come, was at least morally certain.59 On
the other hand, it was held that a promise to pay within so many
days after the defendant should marry was not a negotiable note.
60
Although such paper calling for payment at a time certain to
come, such as the death of the designated person, is open to all
the objections raised against instruments payable at a fixed date
with provision for acceleration upon the happening of an out-
side event, as pointed out above, and more,6 1 nevertheless it is
clear that Section 4-3 adopts the doctrine of the early cases first
cited. Modern cases both before and after the statute follow this
view.6 2
Death is probably the clearest possible example of an event
that js certain to come sometime. The so-called "Southern War
cases," involving promises to pay money at fixed periods after
peace between the North and South, have been referred to as in-
stances of like character, the obligations being said to be contingent
'Evans v. Underwood, i Wils. 262 (1749).
" In addition to Cooke v. Colehan, supra note 57, reliance was placed upon
Andrews v. Franklin, i Strange 24 (792), where the promise was to pay "two
months after a certain ship of His Majesty's service should be paid off." In
Joseph v. Catron, 13 N. M. 2o2, 81 Pac. 439 (19o5), it was suggested that the two
cases were quite different: whereas the paying off of a public ship may be highly
certain there is no such certainty that a particular individual will receive his pay.
'Beardsley v. Baldwin, 2 Strange 1151 (792).
' In acceleration paper there is at least an ultimate date of maturity that is
fixed or determinable, according to which the positions of subsequent purchasers
may be determined.
cClenatban v. Davis, 243 Il1. 87, 9o N. E. 265 (1909), 27 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 1017 (I91) ; Price v. Jones, 1O5 Ind. 543, 5 N. E. 683 (1886) ; Harper
v. Davis, 115 Md. 349, 8o Atl. 1012 (911), 35 L. R. A. (N. s.) lO26 (1912) ;
Sheldon v. Blackman, 188 Wis. 4, 2o5 N. W. 486 (1925) ; Hegeman v. Moon,
131 N. Y. 462, 3o N. E. 487 (1892); cf. Kerr v. Smith, 142 N. Y. Supp. 57
(1913). In Zimmerman v. Zimmerman, 262 Pa. 540, io6 Atl. 198 (1919), an
instrument in form a promissory note contained a promise to pay "one day after
date . . . to be paid at my death." It was held not a good note because of
uncertainty as to maturity. Under the circumstances it would probably not
have been a sound construction that it was payable at the fixed date or earlier in
case of death, although this might have saved the instrument as one with an
acceleration provision.
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upon an event which was morally certain to happen. 63 Those cases,
however, are far from satisfactory authorities as to the status of
the instruments, since most of the decisions did not depend upon
there being promissory notes involved. There are many instances
of promises or orders to pay upon or after events which were
not certain to happen.
Instances of events not certain to happen, making orders
and promises to pay at or with reference to such happenings non-
negotiable, are of wide variety. The following provisions have
been deemed to call for payment at a time fatally uncertain, so
that the instruments are non-negotiable, or more accurately, not
bills or notes :61 "payed when we get it from the Brewery after
date;" 65 "Due . . . when he is twenty-one years old;" "I
"Upon confirmation by the Congress of the United States of that
certain land grant known . . " 67 "In the event this sale is not
consummated ... it (the promise) shall be null and void;" 68 "On
settlement of William Dagel Estate after date," although by stat-
ute all final settlements of estates were required to be made within
three years, unless otherwise ordered by court ;69 "On arrival at
' Joseph v. Catron, supra note 59, at 218. The court said: "In human
experience no war has ever existed which has not come to an end, and none can
be conceived of that will not have at some time a termination." On this basis a
distinction might be drawn between a maturity depending upon the termination
of a war and, on the other hand, one depending upon the signing of a treaty of
peace.
" It is, of course, a requisite of any bill or note, whether negotiable or not,
that it be payable at a time certain or on demand, etc. So commonly is the liti-
gation settled by the conclusion that the paper in question is non-negotiable, that
many requirements necessary to any bill or note are thought of as prerequisites
to negotiability.
'Wray v. Miller, 12o N. Y. Supp. 787 (igio) ; Manhattan Co. v. Morgan,
242 N. Y. 38, i5o N. E. 594 (1926).
I Kelley v. Hemmingway, 13 Ill. 604 (1852). The court distinguished Goss
v. Nielson, I Burr. 226 (1757), where an instrument was held to be a good note
although payable to the infant payee "when he shall come of age," and specify-
ing the time when that would be. Lord Mansfield evidently thought the promise
was to pay on the specified date, the reference to the payee's then arriving at
age being merely additional information.
'7Joseph v. Catron, supra note 59. Confirmation was not even morally
certain.
"State Bank v. Williams, 277 S. W. 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923), rev'g, 252
S. W. 222 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923) ; Bast v. Sproll, 176 Wis. 371, 187 N. W. 223
(1922).
e Scott v. Dagel, 200 Iowa 1090, 205 N. W. 859 (1925).
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port of destination;" 70 "When a dividend shall be declared ;" 71
"This note is payable when Post Office Department accepts my
building from me;" 72 "Payable when plastering is done ;" 7
"When that section of the road is built which lies between" two
stated points."
In an Iowa case, 75 although the point seems not to be neces-
sarily involved, the court treats an instrument in form a promis-
sory note, payable "when the present indebtedness of Highland
Park Company is paid," to be a note, due after a reasonable time
for payment of the debts." Paper payable when convenient,
when able, etc., ought not to rank as bills or notes, 77 however en-
forceable such promises may be as contracts.
HAPPENING OF CONTINGENCY
The concluding sentence of the fourth section, "An instru-
ment payable upon a contingency is not negotiable, and the hap-
pening of the event does not cure the defect," is susceptible of a
possible meaning, standing by itself, that would render non-
negotiable all paper with acceleration provisions. The happen-
ing of the accelerating event, whether maturity follows auto-
matically or only upon the exercise of an option, matures the in-
"The Lykus, 36 Fed. 919 (S. D. N. Y. 1888) ; cf. Randall v. Johnson, 59
Miss. 317 (1881).
I Brooks v. Hargreaves, 21 Mich. 254 (1870).
'Devine v. Price, 152 N. Y. Supp. 321 (1915).
"Smith v. Hurlburt Co., 93 Conn. 391, io6 AUt. 319 (1919).
'Illinois Midland Ry. v. Bank, 200 Ill. App. 591 (igi6); cf. Stevens v.
Blunt, 7 Mass. 240 (181o) ; Crawford v. Johnson, 87 Mo. App. 478 (igoi).
'Dille v. Longwell, 188 Iowa 6o6, 176 N. W. 61g (1920).
" The case is properly criticised in (1920) 5 IOWA L. BULL. 266. See also
(1920) 18 MIcH. L. REv. 696. The court relied upon Kiskadden v. Allen, 7
Colo. 2o6, 3 Pac. 221 (1883) ; Dobbins v. Oberman, 17 Neb. 163, 22 N. W. 356
(1885); Sears v. Wright, 24 Me. 278 (1844); Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me. 195
(1875); Stevens v. Blunt, 7 Mass. 240 (18io); Cota v. Buck, 48 Mass. 588
(1844) ; Page v. Cook, 164 Mass. 116, 41 N. E. 115 (1895) ; Pistel v. Ins. Co.,
88 Md. 552, 42 Atl. 210 (1898); Randall v. Johnson, 59 Miss. 317 (188);
Ubsdell v. Cunningham, 22 Mo. 124 (1855); Lewis v. Tipton, io Ohio St. 88
(1859); Benton v. Benton, 78 Kan. 366, 97 Pac. 378 (1908) ; Goodloe v. Taylor,
3 Hawks 458 (N. C. 1825) ; Smithers v. Junker, 41 Fed. IOI (C. C. N. D. Ill.
1889); Nunez v. Dautel, 86 U. S. 56o (1873). Most of these cases do not
necessarily decide that the instrument was a note.
'Humphrey v. Beckwith, 48 Mich. 151 (1882) ; Ex parte Tootell, 4 Ves.
Jr. 372 (1798).
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strument in a sense upon a contingency. It must be perfectly
clear that it could not have been intended by this concluding sen-
tence to make objectionable those provisions permitted by the
preceding subdivisions. Its fair meaning would seem to be that
paper whose only maturity is dependent upon a contingency which
may or may not happen is non-negotiable. 78 Instruments are ne-
gotiable or not according to their status at the time of issuance 79
and the later happening of the event has no more effect in render-
ing the instrument negotiable, because the uncertainty as to ulti-
mate maturity is then removed, than the satisfaction of the con-
dition in a conditional promise or order has upon the standing
of a document which is non-negotiable because the promise or
order is not absolute in its terms.
' Bonart v. Rabito, supra note 18.
" No instrument is negotiable that was not so when issued. It does not
follow from this, however, that once negotiable always negotiable. A restric-
tive indorsement, for example, converts a negotiable paper into one non-
negotiable.
